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In mobile organizations such as enterprises operating
on field, healthcare organizations and military and civil-
ian coalitions, individuals, because of the role they have,
may need to access common information resources through
location-aware applications. To enable a controlled and
privacy preserving access to such applications, a compre-
hensive conceptual framework for an access control system
enhanced with location privacy is presented.
1 Introduction
A challenging application area for mobile technology is
represented by the development of location-based services
(LBS) for mobile organizations. By mobile organization we
mean a community of individuals that, because of the role
they have, need to access common information resources
through location-based services. Mobile organizations in-
clude enterprises operating on field such as fleet manage-
ment and resources tracking, healthcare and leisure organi-
zations, military and civilian coalitions created in response
to a crisis, e.g., natural disaster, humanitarian relief and war.
In these organizations the mobile members are character-
ized not only by an identity but also by a role. The concept
of role is used in various contexts, e.g. CSCW, Security,
Distributed Artificial Intelligence to organize and structure
the division of responsibility. Broadly speaking a role is a
set of rights and duties assigned to a subject who plays that
role [22].
As running example consider an organization in charge
of the management of a national park in which LBS are
used to support the mobile personnel as well the visitors
of the park. Individuals have different roles, say rangers,
scientists, employees and tourists. Furthermore they are
equipped with location-aware mobile terminals with which
they invoke LBS, such as map services, needed for their
activity. This scenario introduces a number of important re-
quirements:
• Because of the different activities of the organization’s
members, it is reasonable to consider that LBS (ser-
vices for short) are requested based on the roles of indi-
viduals. For example, the services which are available
to a ranger may be different from those made avail-
able to tourists, not simply because of the individual
preferences but mainly because of organizational and
functional reasons. Such requirements calls for the de-
velopment of an access control mechanism supporting
the specification of which user can access which ser-
vice in which context, based also on the role of the
user.
• The accessibility of services may depend also on the
position of the user. For example, the visitors of the
park may be allowed to request services only when lo-
cated in the area of the park. It seems thus important
to extend the classical notion of access control mecha-
nism to account for the mobility of the user under the
hypothesis of a bounded space. Space may be bounded
for several reasons: because of physical constraints
(e.g. the boundaries of the park), or because of mar-
keting choices (e.g. the broader is the area assigned
to the tourist, the more the tourist pays) or for security
reasons (e.g. services in military zones). Furthermore,
the extent of the reference space may depend on the
user’s role. We refer to the roles which are meaningful
over a limited portion of space as spatial roles.
• Privacy concerns are also very relevant because of the
capability of the technologies to collect, store and dis-
close the location of individuals. Privacy involving
location is commonly referred to as location privacy
[2]. Concern for location privacy raises primarily be-
cause of information retention, that is each time a ser-
vice is requested, the identity and the location of the
user are transferred to the service provider and then
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recorded. John, who is a manager of a business enter-
prise, fears that malicious parties may eavesdrop per-
sonal location data, and then, by relating these data
with external sources, make inferences on his business
activity. Therefore John wants to control what location
data are retained. Several proposals have been devel-
oped [3, 8, 12, 14] to address such issue. A common
approach, which has a lot of variations, is to perturb
individual location data before they being transmitted
or disclosed. In general, however, in these approaches
the organizational dimension is not considered that is
what we focus on here.
To address these requirements, access control systems
must on one hand be based on functional roles and loca-
tions of users, and on the other hand be integrated with lo-
cation privacy preserving techniques. Such an access con-
trol system would thus be able to support the specification
and enforcement of location-based and function-based ac-
cess control policies without however resulting in privacy
breaches. To date no such comprehensive approaches have
been developed.
The goal of this work is to propose such a comprehen-
sive approach. In particular we propose an architecture for
a privacy-preserving access control system for mobile orga-
nizations. The system filters the requests for service sent
by the user, determines whether the request can be accepted
based on the role and position of the user, and forwards an
anonymous request together with a perturbed location to the
application server which implements the requested service.
The architecture is based on GEO-RBAC [4], an access con-
trol model which extends the RBAC model (Role Based Ac-
cess Control Model) defined by NIST [25] with the concept
of spatial role. In this model, a user is authorized to play a
role in a session only when located in the space associated
with the role, that is, the role extent. A spatial role can thus
be in the enabled state or in the disabled state, depending
on the user position. The access control function determines
the set of enabled roles according to time and position and
consequently the services which are available to the user at
a given location and time instant.
In the paper we focus on the following aspects: a) the
architecture of the access control mechanism; b) the strat-
egy for location privacy preserving. Both those aspects have
not been investigated as part of our past work. In particu-
lar, issues related to privacy for GEO-RBAC and for other
RBAC systems have not been yet investigated. The major
contributions of the paper are:
• Definition of the semantics of the access control func-
tion. In particular we enhance the model of spatial
role, introducing the distinction between replaceable
and non-replaceable role. A replaceable role is a role
which can be replaced by a “less powerful” role. An
algorithm is defined to determine the set of time vary-
ing enabled roles in the extended model.
• Definition of an event-based architectural framework
for the access control system. When the status of some
user’s role changes in time, the event is notified to the
corresponding mobile terminal. The user can thus be
aware at each time instant of the available services.
• Definition of a privacy strategy which enables the user
to dynamically control which location data are trans-
mitted, according also to the organizational privacy
rules.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
discuss the semantics of the access control function. In the
subsequent section we introduce the architecture of the sys-
tem and in particular the access control mechanism imple-
menting the above function and the location privacy strat-
egy. Next we discuss some open issues. Conclusions and
future work are reported in the final section.
2 Preliminaries
Before discussing the access control function, we briefly
review the basic concepts underlying the reference model
GEO-RBAC. We focus in particular on the following com-
ponents of the model: a) the position model; b) the spatial
role model. For a complete description of the model, we
refer the reader to [4].
2.1 The position model
The position model describes the position of the user.
The model is based on the distinction between real and logi-
cal position. The real position corresponds to the position of
the user on Earth acquired through some positioning tech-
nology. Real positions can be represented as geometries of
different types since, depending on the chosen technology
and accuracy requirements, they may correspond to points
or polygons. The logical position supports a representation
of positions that is almost independent from the underlying
positioning technology. Further, besides a geometry, it has
a semantics. For example, logical positions can be a house,
an address number, or a road. In compliance with current
standards [24], the semantics is denoted by a spatial feature
type. The logical position is computed from real positions
by using a mapping function. For example, a mapping func-
tion can be defined to map a position acquired through GPS
onto the closer road segment. Logical positions are crucial
in supporting advanced LBS and in enabling knowledge-
based spatial applications.
2.2 Spatial roles
A spatial role (role for short) describes a spatially
bounded function for a user, or set of users. A role has a role
name and a role extent. The role extent defines the bound-
aries of the space in which the role can be played by the
user. For example ParkRanger(Y ellowstone) is a spatial
role: ParkRanger is the role name and Yellowstone is the
role extent, that is, the identifier of a spatial object describ-
ing a region in the reference space. Each role is assigned a
set of permissions. A permission corresponds to a service.
Thus saying that a permission prm is conferred on a role r,
means that the users playing role r are enabled to access the
service corresponding to prm. However, for a role r to be
effective the user must be located in the extent of r. When
such an event occurs, the role is enabled; it is disabled, oth-
erwise.
The model distinguishes between role instances and role
schemas. Role instances are ParkRanger (Yellowstone)
and ParkRanger(AleshPark). The role schema specifies the
properties which are common to the set of role instances
having the same name. Specifically, a role schema defines:
a common name for a set of roles, the type of role extent,
the type of logical location, and the mapping function re-
lating the real position with the logical position. For ex-
ample: ParkRanger(Park, ParkSector, m) is the schema for
park ranger roles defined for the areas of the park. The log-
ical position of the users is identified by the sector of the
park, supposed the park is subdivided in zones, which is
computed by applying function m to the real position.
2.3 Spatial roles hierarchy
Spatial roles are organized in a hierarchy, defined by in-
troducing a partial order  over the set of roles. We intro-
duce the concept in a simplified manner through an exam-
ple. Consider the two roles R1=ParkEmployee(region1)
and R2=ParkRanger(region2). If we state thatR1  R2
it means that:
• An individual which is a park ranger is also an em-
ployee. Therefore the permissions which are assigned
to an employee are assigned also to a park ranger;
• The role extent of R2 is spatially contained in the role
extent of R1, that is, region2 is contained in region1;
• if role R2 is enabled, R1 is also enabled. Moreover
the logical position of the park ranger in region1 is
spatially contained in the logical position computed for
the same user as employee in region2.
The use of role hierarchies is instrumental in simplifying
both the specification and the management of roles as well
as of their permissions. The hierarchy of roles is formally
represented by extending the notion of role graph [23]. In
particular we use the role graph to represent the set of roles
through a lattice in which the nodes are the roles and the
edges represent the precedence relationship. In addition to
the user-defined roles, every role graph has a MaxRole ()
and a MinRole (⊥). MaxRole has assigned the union of
all permissions. Further, because the role is spatial, it has
also an extent. Such extent results from the intersection of
all extents, and can be empty. MaxRole is introduced to
ensure that the common precedence relationship is always
defined; however, it is most likely the case that, in order
to improve security through separation of duty, no user is
assigned the permission to use this role. MinRole represents
the minimum set of privileges available to all roles, possibly
empty. Like MaxRole, MinRole has an extent. In this case
the extent is the whole reference space,i.e. SPACE.
We draw the role graph without redundant edges through
a Hasse diagram. In the paper we use the convention that
the MinRole is drawn at the top. A role preceding r is an
ancestor of r.
As an example, consider the set of roles
R={A(s0), B(s1), C(s2), D(s3), E(s4), F (s5)} where
X(Ext) denotes the role X with a spatial extent identified
by Ext. Without loosing in generality, we assume that
roles are univocally identified by their names. Assume
A(s0)  B(s1); A(s0)  C(s2); A(s0)  F (s5);
B(s1)  D(s3); B(s1)  E(s4) and C(s2)  E(s4). The
corresponding graph is reported in Fig.1(a) .
Figure 1. Role hierarchy (a) and role extents
(b).
For sake of readability, in the graphical representation,
the nodes of the graph are labeled only with roles names.
An arrow from X to Y means X  Y . We assume the
role extents in Fig.1(b). Note that the extents of two non-
comparable roles, thus roles which are not the one ancestor
of the other, such as roles B and C, can overlap. Therefore,
if a user is located in the intersection area of two roles, both
of them will be enabled. Moreover, it should be noticed
that the containment relationship between extents is not a
sufficient condition for the roles to be comparable, since the
role ordering is application-dependent. In the example, the
extent of role F is contained in that of C , but the roles are
not comparable.
3 Access control function
In GEO-RBAC, the access control function determines
whether a given permission , e.g. service, can be granted to
a user in position p. When a user connects to the system a
new session is activated and a number of roles are selected
to be included in the session role set. However, for a session
role to be enabled, the user should be located within the
space of the role extent. Because users are mobile, however,
the set of enabled roles within a session changes in time.
Since enabled roles are the basis for defining the access
control mechanism, we focus on how these roles are com-
puted. The problem can be formulated as follows: given a
set of session roles S ∈ R and given a point p ∈ SPACE,
determine the roles which are enabled when the user of the
session is in position p. With reference to the role graph in
Fig.1, assume that the set S of session roles consists of the
roles S = {D,E}. Which roles are enabled when the user
is in position p?
We claim that there is no a unique answer. In the ex-
ample, we can devise two interpretations: a) the first one is
that the set of enabled roles is ER = {D,B,A}. The mo-
tivation is that p is contained in only one of the two session
role extents, in particular in the extent of D , therefore ER
contains D as well as its ancestors, because of the definition
of hierarchy, that is B and A; b) the second interpretation is
that ER = {D,C,B,A}, which differs from the previous
one because of element C. The motivation is that p is con-
tained not only in the extent of D but also in the extent of
C. Because C is an ancestor of E, which is a session role,
it seems reasonable to include it in the set of enabled roles.
The intuition behind this second interpretation is that the
user not only can play the roles that he has selected but also
a weaker version of them, represented by their ancestors in
the role hierarchy.
The above example shows that, in order to determine the
set of enabled roles, we have to define what happens if a
role is not enabled. As we have seen, there are two possible
interpretations. Which of them is the most suitable depends
on the semantics of roles and thus on the requirements of
the applications. Therefore, for the sake of generality, we
propose a model in which the behavior to adopt is assumed
to be specific for each role and explicitly defined. When
the user is allowed to play, in place of the session role r, a
weaker role, in the sense discussed above, we say that r is a
replaceable role (R-role); otherwise we say that r is a non
replaceable role (NR-role). We call this property of the role
replacement property.
3.1 A Model for R-roles and NR-roles
Given a role r, the replacement property of r is expressed
by an attribute dist (distance) of the role indicating the
maximum distance which is allowed for an ancestor to re-
place the role. Specifically, dist = 0 means that the role
cannot be replaced by any other role and thus it is a NR-
role; if dist > 0 then the role can be replaced by a role at
maximum distance dist and therefore it is a R-role. By re-
stricting the value of the distance attribute, we can introduce
the constraint that a role cannot be replaced by a role that
is too far, thus too generic. This results in a greater expres-
sivity. The algorithm for computing the set of enabled roles
for a user located in a given position is defined as follows.
Algorithm 1 Given a session of user u, consider a set S
of session roles consisting of R-roles and NR-roles. Assign
ER = . Then for each role r ∈ S do:
1. Determine the real position rp of user u;
2. Compute the logical position lp, based on the role
schema of r;
3. Determine whether lp is contained in the extent of r.
If it is the case, then r is enabled and added to the set
ER if not already present;
4. If the role r is not enabled but it is a R-role, determine
whether one or more ancestor roles exist at the max-
imum distance specified by the replacement property
which can be enabled. If it is the case, the roles are
added to the set ER. Conversely if r is a NR-role, no
operation is performed;
5. Add to ER the ancestors of the roles in ER.
Consider the running example. Assume the session roles
D and E to be R-roles which can be replaced by the roles at
distance dist=1. Given the user in position p, let us build set
ER. Because p is contained in the extent of D, the session
role is enabled; thus ER= {D}. Then, for each disabled ses-
sion role, the ancestors which are not included in ER are
considered. The only disabled role is E while the closest
ancestor of E at distance 1 is C which can be enabled and
thus added to the ER. The final set ER includes the ances-
tors of the previous roles, that is ER={D,B,A,C}.
3.2 Extended roles in GEO-RBAC
In order to support the formal representation of the re-
placement property, we have extended GEO-RBAC. Specif-
ically, the replacement property has been specified both in
the role schema, to make it possible applying the property to
all the instances of a role, and in the role instance definition,
in order to characterize the single instance.
The role schema is thus extended with the dist attribute
which defines whether a role is a R-role or a NR-role. All
the instances sharing the same schema inherit the same dis-
tance value. To enhance flexibility, the value of the prop-
erty can however be specified also for single instances. The
structure of the role instance is thus extended with an at-
tribute labeled dist which, if not NULL, overrides the value
of the corresponding attribute defined at schema level. The
value defined at schema level is thus the default value for
all the instances. The definition of the extended schema and
role instance is given next.
Definition 1 (Extended Role schema) Let REXT FT and
LPOS FT be the spatial feature types of, respectively, the
role extent and the logical position. A Role Schema is a
tuple: < r, ext, loc,mloc, dist > where:
• r ∈ R;
• ext ∈ REXT FT ;
• loc ∈ LPOS FT ;
• mloc ∈ M is a location mapping function for feature
type loc;
• dist ∈ N is the distance which indicates whether the
role is replaceable or not. dist = 0 means that the role
is a NR-role; dist > 0 means that the role is a R-role
which can be replaced by any ancestor at a maximum
distance dist from the role.
As an example, consider a possible schema for role E:
< E,ExtE , LocE ,mE, 1 >. In this case, role E is a R-
role since the distance is 1. It means that, unless differently
specified, all role instances of E have the same value for the
replacement property. Specifically, given the role graph of
the example, the instances of E can be replaced by the roles
instances at most at distance 1, that is those denoted as B
and C. Note that a single role can be replaced by one or
more roles. Further, a role cannot be replaced by the⊥ role.
Definition 2 (Extended Role Instance) Given a role
schema rs, an instance ri of rs is a triple < r, e, dist >
where:
• r is the name of the role in schema rs;
• e ∈ F is a spatial feature of the type specified in the
role schema, i.e. rs.ext;
• dist ∈ N the distance, defined as above, for the spe-
cific instance or undefined (NULL).
It should be noticed that the distance property specified at
the instance level is meant, if not NULL, to override the one
defined in the corresponding schema.
Furthermore, for how the model is defined, given a set
of enabled roles, we can map the actual position of the
user onto the semantic locations associated with the enabled
roles, and thus obtain a set of logical positions. This set is
partially ordered with respect to the spatial containment re-
lationship, thus resulting in a lattice structure, that we refer
to as Location Graph (LG). We will use the notion of LG
later on in the paper.
4 A Reference Architecture for the Access
Control System
We address now issues related to a reference architecture
for the proposed access control system. We base our archi-
tecture on the general architectural framework reported in
Fig.2. Such framework consists of three fundamental com-
ponents:
• the mobile users equipped with mobile terminals and
connected to a wireless network. Users are assumed to
be identified by their terminal ID;
• the Application Server providing a set of location-
aware information services;
• the Access Control System (ACS). It is a trusted com-
ponent filtering the users’ requests and protecting lo-
cation privacy. To obtain the position of the user, the
ACS accesses a Location Server which aggregates lo-
cation data from different sources such as the network
and mobile terminals equipped with GPS (connected
by dotted lines in Fig.2 ) and responds to queries such
as retrieve the position of terminal ID. Notice that in
order to prevent uncontrolled disclosure of location
data, the ACS is the only component enabled to query
the Location Server.
A request for a service is processed as follows: the user
requests the service by sending a request message to the
ACS. The ACS then determines whether the request can be
accepted and if it the case the request message is properly
re-structured and sent to the Application Server. Finally,
the requested information is then sent back to the ACS and
then, through it, to the user.
In this section, we focus in particular on the key choices
underlying the architecture:
• The definition of an event-driven approach to the spec-
ification of the access control mechanism. As a state
transition for a session role is detected, the event is no-
tified to the interested components of the system, in-
cluding the user;
• The definition of a privacy strategy which enables the
user, at least to some extent, to control the location data
which are transmitted to the Application Server.
Figure 2. General architecture
4.1 The access control mechanism
The access control mechanism applies the access control
function to determine the set of enabled roles and thus the
services which are accessible to the user at a given location.
For the computation of the enabled roles, in addition to the
previously specified algorithm, we need to define at what
stage these roles are determined. We devise two possible
strategies:
• The status of roles is computed exclusively upon user
request. When the user sends a request to the ACS, the
system determines which roles are enabled and then
based on this information, determines whether the re-
quest is accepted or rejected. The approach is thus
user-driven;
• The status of roles is autonomously checked by an
agent tracking the position of the user connected to the
LBS system. As a state transition occurs for a role,
that is, its status changes from enabled to disabled or
vice versa, the new status is recorded and the event is
notified to interested system components. The strategy
is thus event-driven.
The simplest approach is the user-driven one because the
position of the user is computed on demand and thus the
status of roles is determined only when required. This ap-
proach has however a major drawback, in that the services
which are available in a given session at a given instant are
not known until the user makes an explicit access request.
Therefore it may occur that the user requires a service which
is not accessible in that position or that the user is not aware
of available services at a given position.
Conversely when the event-driven strategy is adopted,
the status of each role is determined asynchronously with
respect to user requests. Therefore such information needs
to be recorded by the ACS. Though more complex, this ap-
proach overcomes the drawbacks of the user-driven strat-
egy: user requests can be more efficiently processed be-
cause the current status of roles is available at the time of
the request and thus need not to be computed; the user can
determine the effective roles she can play, before a request
is made; finally, as we will see, this strategy supports ser-
vices based on the push model.
Because it is arguably more flexible and, additionally, it
is functional to the privacy-preserving strategy that will be
introduced later on, the event-driven approach is the one we
adopt. From an architectural point of view, the proposed
organization for the ACS is based on the following major
components:
• The Policy DB is a data base storing the security poli-
cies specifying, among other information, the spatial
roles, the services available to each role, and the roles
assigned to each user;
• The Session DB records the status of sessions. The
status at time t of session s is represented by the tuple:
< s, t, SR,ER,LG > where:
– SR is the set of session roles, thus the roles se-
lected by the user among those which have been
assigned to her;
– ER is the set of roles enabled in s at time t;
– LG is the Location Graph corresponding to ER.
The nodes of the Location Graph are the logical
positions corresponding to roles in ER. The Lo-
cation Graph thus represents the semantic loca-
tion of the user at different levels of granularity.
As we will see later on, this information is used
for privacy purposes.
• An agent called Role Tracker. It periodically retrieves
from the Location Server the position of the users of
current sessions and determines whether a state transi-
tion has occurred for the roles of each session. If this is
the case, the event is communicated to the Event Man-
ager;
• In response to a Role Tracker event, the Event Man-
ager updates the status of sessions in Session DB and
notifies the event to the corresponding terminal.
4.2 The privacy preserving access strat-
egy
A user requiring a service transmits to the system, be-
sides the service identifier, also her identity and position.
To protect privacy, the user may wish to control the storage
of personal information and in particular what information
about location and user identity are transmitted. What in-
formation is stored is important because the identifiability
and level of detail affect potential future uses and abuses of
the information [21].
The strategy we propose aims at integrating privacy poli-
cies defined at organizational level with the preferences of
the individual, by letting the user dynamically specify, at
least to some extent, the granularity of the identity and of
the location. More specifically, the strategies underlying
our approach are as follows:
i) Perturbation of location data before being transmitted
to the Application Server. This strategy is adopted, in
various forms, by most of the approaches supporting
location privacy. Specifically, the strategy we adopt is
to cloack the location by decreasing the spatial granu-
larity of position, that is the detail of its geometric rep-
resentation to obtain thus an uncertain position (spatial
generalization);
ii) Role-dependent cloaking of personal data. Under this
strategy, spatial generalization can be differently ap-
plied depending on the role of users. For example the
position of a field sales agent may have a granularity
which is different from that of a marketing manager,
not only because they are at different levels in the or-
ganizational hierarchy and thus may have different pri-
vacy rights, but also because the localization may have
different purposes and relevance.
4.2.1 Location data cloaking
The techniques for perturbing location data based on spa-
tial generalization, opposed to those based on the idea of
confusing data [15], have the advantage that the resulting
information, though more imprecise, preserves the correct-
ness of data and thus can be used for analysis purposes, such
as data mining. Hereinafter, we use the term perturbation
to mean spatial generalization. When a spatial generaliza-
tion is performed over a position, the geometric shape of the
object is replaced by a coarser geometry. For example the
position along a road, at the maximum granularity is repre-
sented as a point and at a coarser detail is expressed by the
whole road or even a road at different scale.
In the pioneering work on location privacy of [14] the
idea is to replace a location, consisting of a point, with
the tile of a quadtree-based data structure containing such a
point; in [12], which further develops this idea, the coarser
geometry is not statically defined, but results from a dy-
namic computation. On the other hand, spatial general-
ization has been extensively investigated also in the GIS
field (Geographical Information System) and approaches
have been developed, which although not specifically con-
ceived to protect privacy, can likely be useful for that pur-
pose [7, 11, 27].
In our model, for the sake of generality, we do not spec-
ify any spatial generalization criteria. Rather we define the
mechanisms which enables its specification.
The idea is to specify the generalized location of the
user in terms of logical position. We recall that, in the
model, the logical position is computed dynamically during
the process of access control enforcement, by applying the
location mapping function. The location mapping function
implements the generalization criteria. As a result, given a
user in a position p, the system determines not only whether
a session role r is enabled in p, but also the corresponding
logical position, i.e. the perturbed location. The ACS thus
maps the actual position of the user onto a location accord-
ing to the specified access policies which have been speci-
fied by the security and privacy administrator. The logical
location is then forwarded to the application server.
4.2.2 Dynamic privacy preferences
Because a user can play simultaneously multiple roles and
because roles are organized in a hierarchy, the logical po-
sition of a user may not to be unique. More specifically,
the logical location of the user is described by the Loca-
tion Graph consisting of nodes describing the location at
different granularities. For example if the user in a posi-
tion is enabled to play at the same time the roles of tourist
and driver, two logical positions (at least) can be devised,
such as an address (because of the tourist role) and a road
(because of the driver role). The question that next arises is
which logical position, among the possible ones represented
in the Location Graph, shall be transmitted.
A reasonable strategy is to introduce a priority over lo-
cations, so that in case of conflicting representations, the
location at the highest priority is selected. Because there is
no reason to privilege a prioritization criteria over another,
we consider that such priority is defined by the user when
an access request is made.
The user specifies the logical position and thus the gran-
ularity of location data by selecting a role among those cur-
rently enabled. The selected role is then enclosed in the
request. For example, the previous user specifies in the mes-
sage that the request is sent by in her role as tourist. In such
a way, not only the ACS can solve the ambiguity posed by
the availability of multiple logical locations but also the user
has some control over which personal data at which granu-
larity are transmitted. As a result the user can dynamically
express privacy preferences, which must however be com-
patible with the policies specified at organizational level.
It is important to notice that the user is aware of the cur-
rent enabled roles, since the ACS keeps tracks of the roles
which are enabled in time and, through the Event Manager,
transmits such information to the terminals.
The information flow from the user to the Application
Server is reported in Fig.3. The messages are enclosed
in brackets. Consider a session s, in a given status st=<
s, t, SR,ER,LG > where in particular ER is the set of en-
abled roles in s and LG the corresponding Location Graph.
To invoke a service p, the user of the session sends to ACS
an access request in the form: < s, r, p > where r ∈ ER is
the selected role name. If the request is accepted, the ACS
determines the logical position lp ∈ LG and then the mes-
sage < id, lp, p > is forwarded to the Application Server.
Since multiple requests can arrive from the same session,
we replace the session identifier with a request identifier
(id), which is specific of each single request. The associa-
tion between id and the user is then recorded by ACS.
Notice that since our focus is on the control of loca-
tion granularity when invoking a LBS, we have not ad-
dressed specifically the issue of user anonymity. To ensure
anonymity the removal of the user identity is not a suffi-
cient condition, since the location can be linked with exter-
nal data and thus reveal the identity of the user. To address
this issue, a possible approach is to extend the concept of
k-anonymity to location [12, 14, 29]. The implications of
such an approach over our model will be investigated as part
of future work.
Figure 3. Access Control System: input and
output.
5 Open issues
We now discuss some open issues related to our model.
In designing the architecture of the ACS we have im-
plicitly considered traditional LBS based on the pull model.
Yellow pages and directory service fall in this category. We
have not yet considered the class of services based on the
push model. Under the push model services are still re-
quested by the user, but the information is provided on
a continuous basis. An example is the service which al-
lows one to be automatically notified about nearby traffic
jams. Because in a location-aware context the availability
of the service depends on the position of the user, if the
user changes position in time, it may occur that the user is
no longer in a position which authorizes him/her to access
the service. Because of the event-based architecture, in our
model the change of status is promptly detected and thus it
is reasonable to think of a suspension of the service. Com-
putational models based on the push model are however to
be taken into account to extend our approach.
As discussed above, another important aspect is the inte-
gration of k-anonymity models for location and at the same
time the extension of the privacy solutions from the case of
single locations to the case of trajectories and paths. The
definition of a metric for measuring the quality of service is
also a major issue.
6 Related work
The most important contribution of this paper is the in-
tegration of spatially-aware access control policies and lo-
cation privacy methods for users that require location-based
services. To our knowledge this is the first approach which
provides a comprehensive framework. In contrast there are
several proposals which address only partially the problem
by focusing either on the spatial dimension of access control
or on privacy requirements. In particular, spatially-aware
access control systems have been proposed to regulate the
access to satellite image maps [20], to vector-based spatial
data on Web [5, 19], to spatial data defined at multiple gran-
ularities [1], and to deal with spatial context like in [17, 9].
On the other hand, approaches to location privacy, in addi-
tion to those focused on location cloaking and anonymity
[2, 12, 14, 15] are concerned with privacy issues related
to the disclosure of the information to third parties such
as [13, 16, 26, 30]. In particular, most of these proposals
adopt the idea that policies must be specified by a service
provider explicitly stating how users location information
can be used. In [8], a different research direction is pro-
posed focused on the use of imprecise queries to hide the
location of the query issuer and evaluate uncertain informa-
tion. A framework is also suggested where uncertainty can
be controlled to provide high quality and privacy-preserving
services.
7 Conclusions
In the paper we have presented a comprehensive access
control model augmented with the capability of protecting
location-privacy. The target are professional users or users
which are assigned a role in a mobile community. When
requesting a service, the user can control the granularity of
the identity and position which are transmitted to the Appli-
cation Server. We have also discussed the event-based ar-
chitecture which enables to user to be notified on the avail-
able services, which vary in time because of the position-
depending roles. The result of the work is a conceptual
framework based on a well defined privacy and access con-
trol model the semantics of which has been specified both
in set theoretic and operational terms. Furthermore, we be-
lieve that the introduction of the notion of role and the defi-
nition of an event-based architecture for ACS open the way
to the development of a new category of LBS, referred to
as role-tracking services. Consider for example a tourist of
the park wishing to locate a ranger in order to ask for some
information. In this case a reasonable query is Where is a
ranger?. The service is similar to the popular AT&T Find
Friend [28], but in this case the object to be found is not
a precise individual but rather an unspecified user playing
the requested role. In an organizational setting, like one of
the example, this request seems much more plausible of the
query Where is John? as the tourist of the running example
does not know the identities of the personnel of the park. By
combining our notion of role-tracking services with novel
digital identity platforms [18], a variety of innovative LBS
can be developed for use in a large number of domains.
As part of future work, we plan to investigate several
directions. First we plan to develop a distributed architec-
ture for the access control functions and to provide support
for k-anonymity. We also plan to integrate this model with
the X-GTRBAC system [6], an XML-based temporal ac-
cess control model based on RBAC, in order to obtain an
access control system supporting the specification and en-
forcement of a rich set of context-based access control poli-
cies. Finally, we plan to develop encryption-based access
control techniques specifically tailored to space-based ac-
cess control policies.
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